[RFC] [Vote] PHP 8.3 deprecations

php.internals

Máté Kocsis

3 years ago
Hi Everyone, As previously announced on the list, we have just started the vote about the annual PHP deprecation RFC. Link to the RFC: https://wiki.php.net/rfc/deprecations_php_8_3 Link to the discussion thread: https://externals.io/message/120422 The vote is open until 2023-07-06 12:00:00 UTC.

Nicolas Grekas

3 years ago
> > As previously announced on the list, we have just started the vote about > the annual PHP deprecation RFC. > > Link to the RFC: https://wiki.php.net/rfc/deprecations_php_8_3 > Link to the discussion thread: https://externals.io/message/120422 > > The vote is open until 2023-07-06 12:00:00 UTC. >
Thanks Mate for moving all this forward. I wish we could have voted to keep rand() and getrandmax() and just change them to use the CSPRNG, like we do for array_rand() & co. but I guess this should have been proposed earlier. Might be worth a small follow up RFC to not disrupt the current one. Cheers, Nicolas

Unnamed Person

3 years ago
Den 2023-06-22 kl. 14:52, skrev Nicolas Grekas:
>> >> As previously announced on the list, we have just started the vote about >> the annual PHP deprecation RFC. >> >> Link to the RFC: https://wiki.php.net/rfc/deprecations_php_8_3 >> Link to the discussion thread: https://externals.io/message/120422 >> >> The vote is open until 2023-07-06 12:00:00 UTC. >> > > Thanks Mate for moving all this forward. > > I wish we could have voted to keep rand() and getrandmax() and just change > them to use the CSPRNG, like we do for array_rand() & co. but I guess this > should have been proposed earlier. Might be worth a small follow up RFC to > not disrupt the current one. > > Cheers, > Nicolas >
Sounds like a good idea to me, keeping the functions and making them better. Hope it will fly! Not sure if this is a relevant comparison, but we have code that we now need to change due to deprecation of utf8_decode and utf8_encode. It is code that has been working flawlessly for 9 years, so it's only work and no benefit. Given that deprecations are piling up for 8.x track I think one should be a bit cautious when approaching the next major version. r//Björn L

Nikita Popov

3 years ago
On Thu, Jun 22, 2023, at 12:14, Máté Kocsis wrote:
> Hi Everyone, > > As previously announced on the list, we have just started the vote about > the annual PHP deprecation RFC. > > Link to the RFC: https://wiki.php.net/rfc/deprecations_php_8_3 > Link to the discussion thread: https://externals.io/message/120422 > > The vote is open until 2023-07-06 12:00:00 UTC.
I've voted No on the mt_rand() deprecation proposal. This is a high impact deprecation without sufficient justification. I believe this proposal would have been much better served deprecating only the srand() and mt_srand() functions, as I previously suggested. Going through the arguments against mt_rand() in the RFC:
> They are not cryptographically secure.
This is a feature, not a bug. Not everything needs or wants cryptographically secure random numbers. There's a reason we support both.
> They are not properly reproducible, because the state could be changed unpredictably by any function call, e.g. when a library is updated and adds additional calls to `mt_rand <http://www.php.net/mt_rand>()`.
This is addressed by deprecating mt_srand() only, making Randomizer the only way to get reproducible random number sequences, and relegating mt_rand() to only the cases where reproducibility is not required.
> Any function calling `mt_srand <http://www.php.net/mt_srand>()` with a fixed seed for whatever reason, will ruin randomness for the remainder of the request.
Deprecating (and removing) mt_srand() address this one trivially.
> PHP's Mt19937 implementation only supports passing a single 32 bit integer as the initial seed. Thus there are only ~4 billion possible sequences of random integers generated by Mt19937. If a random seed is used, collisions are expected with 50% probability after roughly 2**16 seeds (as per the birthday paradox). In other words: After roughly 80000 requests without explicit seeding it is likely that a seed and thus a sequence is reused.
Deprecating (and removing) allows us to address this as well, as we are no longer bound to a specific PRNG algorithm or seeding procedure.
> Both the quality of the returned randomness as well as the generation performance of Mt19937 is worse than that of the Xoshiro256StarStar and PcgOneseq128XslRr64 engines that are provided in the object-oriented API.
Same as previous point: If we don't allow seeding we can change the algorithm however we like.
> They are functions with overloaded signatures <https://wiki.php.net/rfc/deprecate_functions_with_overloaded_signatures>, which are problematic for the reasons outlined in the “Deprecate functions with overloaded signatures <https://wiki.php.net/rfc/deprecate_functions_with_overloaded_signatures>” RFC.
While this is technically true, the particular overload in question here is a very mild and unproblematic one. It only enforces that the function is called with zero or two arguments, forbidding one argument. It does not require accepting different combinations of argument types, or change the meaning of arguments, which is what makes overloads problematic. I think the only somewhat sound motivation for this deprecation is that programmers may use the non-cryptographic mt_rand() in a context where cryptographic numbers are required. This is a legitimate concern, but I don't think it's sufficient to deprecate such a widely used function. For the longest time, we only had mt_rand(), and no easy access to a CRPRNG. A lot of mt_rand() misuse dates back to that time. Since the introduction of random_int() and random_string(), getting cryptographic randomness is no harder than getting non-cryptographic randomness (easier, in the case of strings). Regards, Nikita

Go Kudo

3 years ago
2023年6月24日(土) 22:56 Nikita Popov <nikita.ppv@gmail.com>:
> On Thu, Jun 22, 2023, at 12:14, Máté Kocsis wrote: > > Hi Everyone, > > > > As previously announced on the list, we have just started the vote about > > the annual PHP deprecation RFC. > > > > Link to the RFC: https://wiki.php.net/rfc/deprecations_php_8_3 > > Link to the discussion thread: https://externals.io/message/120422 > > > > The vote is open until 2023-07-06 12:00:00 UTC. > > I've voted No on the mt_rand() deprecation proposal. This is a high impact > deprecation without sufficient justification. > > I believe this proposal would have been much better served deprecating > only the srand() and mt_srand() functions, as I previously suggested. Going > through the arguments against mt_rand() in the RFC: > > They are not cryptographically secure. > > This is a feature, not a bug. Not everything needs or wants > cryptographically secure random numbers. There's a reason we support both. > > > They are not properly reproducible, because the state could be changed > unpredictably by any function call, e.g. when a library is updated and adds > additional calls to `mt_rand <http://www.php.net/mt_rand>()`. > > This is addressed by deprecating mt_srand() only, making Randomizer the > only way to get reproducible random number sequences, and relegating > mt_rand() to only the cases where reproducibility is not required. > > > Any function calling `mt_srand <http://www.php.net/mt_srand>()` with a > fixed seed for whatever reason, will ruin randomness for the remainder of > the request. > > Deprecating (and removing) mt_srand() address this one trivially. > > > PHP's Mt19937 implementation only supports passing a single 32 bit > integer as the initial seed. Thus there are only ~4 billion possible > sequences of random integers generated by Mt19937. If a random seed is > used, collisions are expected with 50% probability after roughly 2**16 > seeds (as per the birthday paradox). In other words: After roughly 80000 > requests without explicit seeding it is likely that a seed and thus a > sequence is reused. > > Deprecating (and removing) allows us to address this as well, as we are no > longer bound to a specific PRNG algorithm or seeding procedure. > > > Both the quality of the returned randomness as well as the generation > performance of Mt19937 is worse than that of the Xoshiro256StarStar and > PcgOneseq128XslRr64 engines that are provided in the object-oriented API. > > Same as previous point: If we don't allow seeding we can change the > algorithm however we like. > > > They are functions with overloaded signatures < > https://wiki.php.net/rfc/deprecate_functions_with_overloaded_signatures>, > which are problematic for the reasons outlined in the “Deprecate functions > with overloaded signatures < > https://wiki.php.net/rfc/deprecate_functions_with_overloaded_signatures>” > RFC. > > While this is technically true, the particular overload in question here > is a very mild and unproblematic one. It only enforces that the function is > called with zero or two arguments, forbidding one argument. It does not > require accepting different combinations of argument types, or change the > meaning of arguments, which is what makes overloads problematic. > > > I think the only somewhat sound motivation for this deprecation is that > programmers may use the non-cryptographic mt_rand() in a context where > cryptographic numbers are required. This is a legitimate concern, but I > don't think it's sufficient to deprecate such a widely used function. > > For the longest time, we only had mt_rand(), and no easy access to a > CRPRNG. A lot of mt_rand() misuse dates back to that time. Since the > introduction of random_int() and random_string(), getting cryptographic > randomness is no harder than getting non-cryptographic randomness (easier, > in the case of strings). > > Regards, > Nikita
Hi. Thank you for your valuable input. I would like to ask you a few questions. I think you are right that deprecating `srand()` / `mt_srand()` achieves the goal of making it unavailable for reproducible uses. But why keep the function name `mt_rand()`? It is certainly true that by prohibiting seeding, the PRNG algorithm can be modified at will. But then the `mt` in `mt_rand()` would be out of touch with reality. If this is done merely to maintain code compatibility, then it is not a good idea to keep naming only for compatibility. Also, `mt_rand()` has the problem of depending on the global state of the PHP VM. This is very dangerous in forked use cases such as Swoole, where implicitly seeded random numbers can return the exact same result in the post-fork process. To avoid this, the sequence must be reseeded again after the fork is executed. If only `srand()` / `mt_srand()` is deprecated, this cannot be avoided. The only way to completely solve this problem is to have no random number states in the global area. For this reason, I think everything should be deprecated. If you need pure random numbers without the need for reproducibility, we already have `random_int()` available. This is the only complete and safe way. Most of all, while `mt_rand()` is deprecated, we can wait for PHP 9 to actually remove it from the core. By that time, migration methods using tools such as Rector will probably have become major. The purpose of the deprecation is to avoid including it in new codebases that will be written in the future. I look forward to your reply. Best Regards, Go Kudo

Larry Garfield

3 years ago
On Mon, Jun 26, 2023, at 6:45 AM, Go Kudo wrote:
> 2023年6月24日(土) 22:56 Nikita Popov <nikita.ppv@gmail.com>: > >> On Thu, Jun 22, 2023, at 12:14, Máté Kocsis wrote: >> > Hi Everyone, >> > >> > As previously announced on the list, we have just started the vote about >> > the annual PHP deprecation RFC. >> > >> > Link to the RFC: https://wiki.php.net/rfc/deprecations_php_8_3 >> > Link to the discussion thread: https://externals.io/message/120422 >> > >> > The vote is open until 2023-07-06 12:00:00 UTC. >> >> I've voted No on the mt_rand() deprecation proposal. This is a high impact >> deprecation without sufficient justification. >> >> I believe this proposal would have been much better served deprecating >> only the srand() and mt_srand() functions, as I previously suggested. Going >> through the arguments against mt_rand() in the RFC: >> > They are not cryptographically secure. >> >> This is a feature, not a bug. Not everything needs or wants >> cryptographically secure random numbers. There's a reason we support both. >> >> > They are not properly reproducible, because the state could be changed >> unpredictably by any function call, e.g. when a library is updated and adds >> additional calls to `mt_rand <http://www.php.net/mt_rand>()`. >> >> This is addressed by deprecating mt_srand() only, making Randomizer the >> only way to get reproducible random number sequences, and relegating >> mt_rand() to only the cases where reproducibility is not required. >> >> > Any function calling `mt_srand <http://www.php.net/mt_srand>()` with a >> fixed seed for whatever reason, will ruin randomness for the remainder of >> the request. >> >> Deprecating (and removing) mt_srand() address this one trivially. >> >> > PHP's Mt19937 implementation only supports passing a single 32 bit >> integer as the initial seed. Thus there are only ~4 billion possible >> sequences of random integers generated by Mt19937. If a random seed is >> used, collisions are expected with 50% probability after roughly 2**16 >> seeds (as per the birthday paradox). In other words: After roughly 80000 >> requests without explicit seeding it is likely that a seed and thus a >> sequence is reused. >> >> Deprecating (and removing) allows us to address this as well, as we are no >> longer bound to a specific PRNG algorithm or seeding procedure. >> >> > Both the quality of the returned randomness as well as the generation >> performance of Mt19937 is worse than that of the Xoshiro256StarStar and >> PcgOneseq128XslRr64 engines that are provided in the object-oriented API. >> >> Same as previous point: If we don't allow seeding we can change the >> algorithm however we like. >> >> > They are functions with overloaded signatures < >> https://wiki.php.net/rfc/deprecate_functions_with_overloaded_signatures>, >> which are problematic for the reasons outlined in the “Deprecate functions >> with overloaded signatures < >> https://wiki.php.net/rfc/deprecate_functions_with_overloaded_signatures>” >> RFC. >> >> While this is technically true, the particular overload in question here >> is a very mild and unproblematic one. It only enforces that the function is >> called with zero or two arguments, forbidding one argument. It does not >> require accepting different combinations of argument types, or change the >> meaning of arguments, which is what makes overloads problematic. >> >> >> I think the only somewhat sound motivation for this deprecation is that >> programmers may use the non-cryptographic mt_rand() in a context where >> cryptographic numbers are required. This is a legitimate concern, but I >> don't think it's sufficient to deprecate such a widely used function. >> >> For the longest time, we only had mt_rand(), and no easy access to a >> CRPRNG. A lot of mt_rand() misuse dates back to that time. Since the >> introduction of random_int() and random_string(), getting cryptographic >> randomness is no harder than getting non-cryptographic randomness (easier, >> in the case of strings). >> >> Regards, >> Nikita > > > Hi. > > Thank you for your valuable input. I would like to ask you a few questions. > > I think you are right that deprecating `srand()` / `mt_srand()` achieves > the goal of making it unavailable for reproducible uses. But why keep the > function name `mt_rand()`? > > It is certainly true that by prohibiting seeding, the PRNG algorithm can be > modified at will. But then the `mt` in `mt_rand()` would be out of touch > with reality. If this is done merely to maintain code compatibility, then > it is not a good idea to keep naming only for compatibility. > > Also, `mt_rand()` has the problem of depending on the global state of the > PHP VM. This is very dangerous in forked use cases such as Swoole, where > implicitly seeded random numbers can return the exact same result in the > post-fork process. To avoid this, the sequence must be reseeded again after > the fork is executed. If only `srand()` / `mt_srand()` is deprecated, this > cannot be avoided. > > The only way to completely solve this problem is to have no random number > states in the global area. For this reason, I think everything should be > deprecated. If you need pure random numbers without the need for > reproducibility, we already have `random_int()` available. This is the only > complete and safe way. > > Most of all, while `mt_rand()` is deprecated, we can wait for PHP 9 to > actually remove it from the core. By that time, migration methods using > tools such as Rector will probably have become major. The purpose of the > deprecation is to avoid including it in new codebases that will be written > in the future. > > I look forward to your reply. > > Best Regards, > Go Kudo
For me, it's about the timeline. I'm on board with getting rid of mt_rand() entirely, just not in 2 years time. The new Random extension is still very new, tutorials aren't updated for it yet, there's a few billion lines of code out there already, etc. 2 years is not enough time for deprecation. Yes, the RFC has a footnote right now that we'll have an extra vote for just that one thing come 9.0, but honestly... I have little faith in our ability to engage in that kind of advanced workflow, and it still leaves open the potential for killing off mt_rand() after only 2 years, depending on how the vote goes. If the same deprecation was planned with a longer explicit timeline (deprecate now, don't remove until 10.0, we say that now, up-front), I'd be happy to vote yes. But not with the squishiness and short timeline. --Larry Garfield

Máté Kocsis

3 years ago
Hi Everyone, The votes have ended with the following results: - "Passing negative $widths to mb_strimwidth()": accepted (27 vs. 0 votes) - "The NumberFormatter::TYPE_CURRENCY constant": accepted (29 vs. 0 votes) - "Unnecessary crypt() related constants": rejected (14 vs. 10 votes) - "MT_RAND_PHP": accepted (28 vs. 0 votes) - "Global Mersenne Twister": rejected (13 vs. 16 votes) - "Calling ''ldap_connect'' with 2 parameters": accepted (26 vs. 0 votes) Thanks for everyone for their participation! Regards, Máté Máté Kocsis <kocsismate90@gmail.com> ezt írta (időpont: 2023. jún. 22., Cs 12:14):